Must heads roll?: a critique of and alternative approaches to swift blame by Skarlicki, Daniel P. et al.
r Academy of Management Perspectives
2017, Vol. 31, No. 3, 222–238.
https://doi.org/10.5465/amp.2015.0118
A R T I C L E S
MUST HEADS ROLL? A CRITIQUE OF AND ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES TO SWIFT BLAME
DANIEL P. SKARLICKI
University of British Columbia
ADAM A. KAY
University of British Columbia
KARL AQUINO
University of British Columbia
DAVID FUSHTEY
Simon Fraser University
When mistakes or perceived wrongdoings occur in the workplace, managers—like most
human beings—demonstrate the tendency to locate someone to blame, including assign-
ing responsibility and sanctioning perceived wrongdoers for their actions. We highlight
that although this response can be motivated by organizational, legal, and psychological
factors, blame can be detrimental to the organization and its employees when it occurs in
a spontaneous and nondeliberative manner, which we label swift blame. We argue that
swift blame can involve distorted perceptions and judgment, exacerbate conflict, erode
employee engagement, and stifle organizational learning. We further argue that managers
have a special responsibility to thoughtfully and carefully consider how they react to
perceived wrongdoings. Drawing from dual processing theory of cognition, we propose
that managers can respond more effectively by adopting perspectives that slow down
these tendencies and promote more thoughtful reactions. To this end we highlight re-
search opportunities for three alternatives to swift blame: (a) a no-blame approach,
(b) systems of inquiry and accountability, and (c) mindfulness training.
A patient at City Hospital was given the wrong medi-
cation, causingher togo intoacomaanddie.Elizabeth,
the nurse who administered the medication, was im-
mediately placed on paid administrative leave. An
investigation brought on by a civil lawsuit some time
later revealed that thedrugmanufacturer that supplied
the medication had used almost identical labels for
very differentmedications, and concluded that system
errors could easily have contributed to the patient’s
death. During her leave, Elizabeth developed severe
depression and eventually went on permanent stress
leave.
Scenes like this play out in different forms every day
in workplaces all over the world. Although not often
involving loss of life, the process typically involves an
error or alleged wrongdoing by an employee that po-
tentially results in perceived or real harm to one or
more parties, the organization, or its stakeholders. In
response,managers are often swift to assign blame and
administer sanctions against those held responsible
(Crant & Bateman, 1993). Sanctions can range from
formal disciplinary actions such as warnings and dis-
missals to informal measures such as withholding re-
sources andopportunities,marginalizing, or ostracizing
the perceived wrongdoer (Arvey & Ivancevich, 1980).
Although the process described above unfolds
in a seemingly rational and logical manner, the
propensity to blame when something goes wrong
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appears to be “wired” by evolution—a basic process
of human social cognition designed to quickly
identify and deal with threats in the environment
(Cooley, 1964). According to social capital theory,
because humans are inveterately social creatures our
survival hasdependedon the ability towork together
effectively with others to realize individual goals
(Lin, Cook, & Burt, 2001). As such, people have de-
veloped a keen sense for efficiently identifying in-
dividualswhohinder or frustrate those goals, and for
influencing them to do otherwise. Over the ages,
blame (and the social sanctions it entails) has become
a critical means by which people influence one an-
other to complywith and support their goals (Kelsen,
1943).
As part of a larger toolkit that managers have at
their disposal for influencing employees to behave in
desired ways, blame also serves numerous practical,
legal, and psychological purposes. First, blame pro-
vides a rationale for punishing those who violate the
social order or undermine organizational efficiency
(Weber, 1978). Second, when blame is publicly
assigned it can signal to relevant stakeholders that
managers are acting in accordance with their legal
obligations to do what is in the best interests of the
organization by holding people accountable for their
misdeeds (Bell & Tetlock, 1989). Third, blame can
help managers feel better about themselves by sat-
isfying their own needs to believe that the world is
fair and just (Lerner, 1980) and that they aredoing the
morally right thing (Smith, 2013), and by creating the
(sometimes illusory) impression that they are con-
cerned about fairness (Alicke, 2000).
While blame can serve these and other functional
ends, it can also produce adverse consequences for
organizations and employees, especially when it is
assigned reflexively and with little attempt to fully
understand the circumstances and context sur-
rounding a mistake or perceived harm (Alicke,
1994). In this paper we label such knee-jerk re-
actions swift blame,1 and we describe its implica-
tions for management practice. The main problem
we address in the paper is that, although blame may
be a natural and unavoidable process, swift blame
can have numerous downsides for organizations and
employees. For example, we propose that swift
blame can be especially susceptible to inaccurate
judgments and distorted beliefs that can lead to
sanctions that violate canons of procedural or dis-
tributive justice. Swift blame can impede in-
formation flow and organizational learning because
of a fear of failure and a resistance to understanding
the causes of errors (Khatri, Brown, & Hicks, 2009).
Swift blame can also cause managers to overlook
alternative solutions to organizational problems
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2011). Swift blame can further
stigmatize the blamed party and generate re-
sentment, counterproductive behavior, and disen-
gagement among employees (Sitkin & Bies, 1994).
We highlight how characteristics of modern orga-
nizations conspire to motivate swift blame, and we
draw on dual processing theory (e.g., Kahneman,
2011, 2013) to argue that spontaneous and automatic
blame represents a system 1 mode of thinking. By
encouraging system2 thinking,which involvesmore
deliberate and careful reactions (Lerner, Goldberg, &
Tetlock, 1998), managers can potentially reduce
swift blame and its drawbacks. Various models of
blame exist (e.g., Alicke, 2000; Heider, 1958; Shaver,
2012; Weiner, 2010), and our purpose in this article
is not to explicate a new theory of blame. Rather, we
seek tohighlight themotivators andpotential costs of
an automatic, unthinking blame response and offer
theoretically driven yet actionable solutions to help
managers administer blame more effectively.
Although most people will engage in swift blame
when things go wrong, we focus on managers for
several reasons. First, as argued above,managers can
have considerable legal, organizational, and psy-
chological motivations to blame. Second, managers
canpersonify theorganization (Rhoades,Eisenberger,
& Armeli, 2001). Their actions can ripple throughout
the organization and come to represent its culture,
which canaffect such factors as employeemotivation,
engagement, performance, and turnover (Schein,
2010). Third, assigning responsibility and sanction-
ing perceived wrongdoers can trigger procedural
justice concerns because managers can simulta-
neously play multiple roles in their organization—
including disputant, judge, and enforcer. Managers
can also feel the need to justify their sanctions to
others (i.e., their superiors).Thus, given theirmultiple
roles andmotivations, the organizational significance
of their decisions, and the procedural justice con-
cerns that arise from their decisions, managers hold
a special duty to administer blame in a careful and
considered manner and respond to errors and per-
ceived wrongdoings in the most functional way
possible.
We advance our argument in three parts. First, we
define the blame process and elaborate on factors
1 We use the term swift blame as analogous to swift trust
(Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996), which is similarly
characterized as an instinctual and reflexive response to
one’s environment.
2017 223Skarlicki, Kay, Aquino, and Fushtey
present inmostworkplaces thatmotivatemanagerial
blame. Second, we argue based on theory and em-
pirical evidence that in most organizational settings,
managers are likely to be tempted to engage in swift
blame, and we highlight potential costs associated
with doing so. Third, we illustrate three perspectives
that have the potential to slow down the blame re-
sponse, allowing space for a more thoughtful and
deliberate approach and thereby lessening swift
blame’s negative consequences. For each perspec-
tive, we highlight suggestions for future research.
THE BLAME PROCESS
Two Components of Blame
Numerous writers (e.g., Fincham & Shultz, 1981;
Heider, 1958; Shultz, Schleifer, & Altman, 1981;
Weiner, 1995) have discussed blame as having two
basic components: (a) assigning responsibility to
someone for having caused a mistake or perceived
harm and (b) holding those deemed blameworthy
accountable for their perceived transgressions. Al-
though in everyday language these concepts are used
interchangeably, in this article we label the over-
arching topic as blame and its two constituent com-
ponents as assigning responsibility and sanctioning,
respectively.
Although the two components of blame tend to be
sequentially related (i.e., sanctioning perceived
wrongdoers follows the assignment of responsibility),
they can also occur in reverse order. Managers can
engage in a posteriori reasoning (Alicke &Davis, 1989)
by assigning responsibility as a way to justify sanc-
tioning decisions to themselves and others (Haidt,
2001; Kelley, 1967). Managers can also experience
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1954), in which they
can deem a party to be especially blameworthy be-
cause of the high degree of punishment the party has
received (Lerner, 1971).
The two factors of blame can also occur in-
dependently. Managers can—and sometimes feel
pressure to—dole out harsh punishment to an em-
ployee whom they deem to be only remotely
blameworthy for a mistake or perceived harm,
sometimes to signal organizational norms (O’Reilly
& Weitz, 1980). On the other hand, managers can
respond forgivingly to an employee whom they de-
termine is 100% responsible for a mistake or per-
ceived harm. Moreover, sanctions can assume any
number of forms, from the private and relatively
benign to the public and objectively severe. In the
first instance, managers can express blame by quiet
rebuke or perhaps just “making a note in the file” of
theperceivedwrongdoer. In the latter case,managers
can issue a public reprimand or possibly even ter-
minate the perceived wrongdoer. A panoply of op-
tions exist, and managers can have broad discretion
to act in ways they think best befit the situation.
Importantly, both components of blame involve
subjective perceptions, including judgments about
causality, intentionality, and personal responsibility
(see discussion of levels of responsibility by Heider,
1958), among other considerations. Both compo-
nents are affectedby factors suchas the foreseeability
of the perceived harm (Karlovac & Darley, 1988;
Lagnado & Channon, 2008); its controllability and
the intentions behind it (Alicke, 2000; Heider, 1958;
Maselli & Altrocchi, 1969); the causal relationship
between the impugned actions and the perceived
violation (Brickman, Ryan, & Wortman, 1975;
Johnson, Ogawa, Delforge, & Early, 1989); the se-
verity of the perceived wrongdoing (Alicke & Davis,
1989; Baron&Hershey, 1988); the justifiability of the
impugned actions and other mitigating circum-
stances (Mikula, 2003; Snyder & Higgins, 1988); and
even the personal characteristics of the perceiver
(Berg&Vidmar, 1975;Hamilton, 1978, 1980;Nemeth
& Sosis, 1973; Sosis, 1974), the victim (Alicke, Davis,
& Pezzo, 1994; Landy & Aronson, 1969), and the
wrongdoer (Bradfield & Aquino, 1999; Efran, 1974;
Sigall & Ostrove, 1975). In summary, the attribution
and administration of blame is a complex process
and can vary considerably according to the
circumstances.
What Motivates Managerial Blame?
Numerous organizational, legal, and psychologi-
cal factors canmotivatemanagers to engage inblame.
Organizational factors.Organizations create and
impose managerial role mandates as well as disci-
plinary policies for various mistakes and perceived
infractions. Hence, managers can feel required to
assign responsibility and sanction perceived
wrongdoers as a result of organizational expecta-
tions (Butterfield, Trevino, & Ball, 1996). If man-
agers fail to comply, they may themselves be
subject to blame (Knobe, 2003). Moreover, as
leaders of the organization, managers have an im-
plied obligation to expediently defend and uphold
the legitimacy of the rules that define it. In so doing,
managers not only act to satisfy the formal expec-
tations associatedwith their role, but they also send
a signal to other would-be wrongdoers that con-
tinued violations of the organizational order—and
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therefore challenges to its existing power structure—
will not go unaddressed. Further, by assigning
blame, managers create the perception that they
have agency, thereby amplifying their power over
the person being blamed and reinforcing their own
authority in the organization (Weber, 1978). As
such, blame can be an important managerial tool
for maintaining structure—and stability—within
an organization. Doing so promptly and efficiently
can be viewed as a signal of the manager’s
competence.
Legal factors. Various legal factors can heighten
managers’ need to blame and sanction offenders.
Every society that functions in accordance with the
rule of law has an evolving set of statutes and regu-
lations that formally codify the standards of behavior
expected of its citizenry. These include laws and
regulations across a wide range of legal domains—
including criminal, employment, human rights, and
environmental laws, to name a few. Such laws and
regulations are highly relevant to organizations be-
cause they tell managers what they can, cannot, and
sometimes must do in response to perceived viola-
tions. For example, in some jurisdictions managers
have a positive legal duty under human rights leg-
islation to take reasonable measures to respond to
complaints of sexual harassment in the workplace
(England, 2008). This is not a matter of managerial
discretion. That which can be considered “reason-
able” varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but can
require that wrongdoers be identified and subjected
to remedial measures. As a result, whether for good
or bad, managers are sometimes legally required to
engage in blame. Not complying with the law could
result in the manager’s professional and personal
liability.
Even when blame is not formally required by law,
managers can feel compelled by nonbinding legal
instruments to identify and hold accountable per-
ceived wrongdoers. For example, Agenda 21—the
highly influential but nonbinding United Nations
action plan for sustainable development—calls on
business organizations to abide by a breathtakingly
broad range of social and environmental principles
(Sitarz, 1993), which can also be reflected in an or-
ganization’s corporate social responsibility (CSR)
policies and codes of conduct. While not strictly re-
quired to do so by law,managers can feel obligated or
possibly even empowered to identify and hold to
account perceived violators of such principles.
Psychological factors. Assigning blame and
sanctioning offenders are more than tools of organi-
zational and legal mandate; blame is also an
“inherently psychological construct” (Alicke, 2000,
p. 556). Heider’s (1958) classic work, for example,
viewedblameas a cognitiveprocess bywhichpeople
solve everyday problems and become more effica-
cious in their interactions with their environments.
He described individuals as naive psychologists
attempting to determine the causes of both positive
and negative outcomes.
Managerial blame serves numerous other psy-
chological functions. First, according to self-
affirmation theory, blaming others is a self-serving
technique by which managers can maintain a posi-
tive self-concept (Crocker & Park, 2004). Said dif-
ferently, blaming others helps managers feel better
about themselves. When a threat to the self-concept
emerges—such as a failure in the workplace—
managers are commonly motivated to assign re-
sponsibility to factors other than themselves
(e.g., their subordinates) for that failure (Campbell &
Sedikides, 1999). Second, blame is associated with
negative affect (Alicke, 2000; Weiner, 1995) and can
serve as a kind of emotional pressure valve by help-
ing managers alleviate the anger they experience
when perceived harms go unaddressed (Lerner et al.,
1998).Third, blameand the social sanctions it entails
can help restore managers’ sense of social justice,
which can tip out of balance when they perceive
violations of the organizational order (Carlsmith,
Darley, & Robinson 2002), and uphold the widely
held yet illusory belief that the world is fair and just
(Lerner, 1980). Thus, assigning responsibility and
sanctioning perceived offenders serves to comfort
managers by assuring them that there is a moral
balance to the world they inhabit (Heider, 1958) and
that they have a certain agency in upholding that
balance (Kelley, 1972; Wortman et al., 1975).
In summary, organizational, legal, and psycholog-
ical factors can all motivate managerial blame. These
factors, however, are likely tovary in their importance
to swift blame.Forexample,unless there is a statuteor
regulation that requires unusually swift action, sub-
jectively perceived pressure and psychological fac-
tors have the potential to weigh more heavily than
legal factors. Moreover, these factors are likely to in-
teract with one another in fostering swift blame. Ask,
Granhag, and Rebelius (2011), for instance, found
that social norms, such as goal activation, sped up
criminal investigators’ information processing, lead-
ing them to overlook important information when
processing criminal cases. Esnard and Dumas (2013)
provided participants a scenario in which a child
was sexually abused. Participants with a high need
for closure perceived victims as less credible and
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guiltier as compared to individuals with a low need
for closure.
SWIFT BLAME AS SYSTEM 1 THINKING
Recent theorizingandresearchonhumancognition
suggests the presence of two information-processing
systems in the human brain (e.g., Kahneman, 2011,
2013).System1 thinking is characterizedby thoughts,
ideas, feelings, and response tendencies that are pro-
duced automatically by a particular context without
any specific intent. System 1 responses are swift and
involuntary. They occur with no apparent effort in
spite of all the computation that can be involved in
making judgments. Alicke (2000) similarly proposed
that “blame attributions are influenced by relatively
unconscious, spontaneous evaluations of the mental,
behavioral, and consequence elements” (p. 558).
These responses are believed to have aided in human
survival.
System 2 thinking, in contrast, is planned, effort-
ful, and intentional. System 2 responses involve ef-
fort, control, and inhibition, which can take time and
consume resources. System 2 thinking can override
system 1 responses by facilitating rule-based, ratio-
nal, and analytical thought. An important charac-
teristic of system2, however, is that it operates by the
principle of least effort. As such, whenever possible
people tend to avoid system 2 thinking (Kahneman,
2011).
A drawback of system 1 processing concerns
“associative coherence,” which refers to the ten-
dency for humans to construct representations of
various aspects of the world in such a way that they
are consistent with one another. Associative co-
herence has many manifestations, including a mis-
understanding of how themind and the world work
(Kahneman, 2013). For example, individuals tend
to consider that their beliefs arise out of reasoning,
and that their preferences, opinions, and conclu-
sions are the result of a reasoned and rational pro-
cess. Kahneman (2011) pointed out and provided
considerable empirical evidence, however, that
individuals commonly believe evidence and argu-
ments because they are consistentwith their a priori
opinions and beliefs, not the other way around.
Importantly, Kahneman (2013) argued that “unless
we slowourselves downby system2,we are going to
be incorrect” (p. 1337). We extend this reasoning to
managerial blaming and elaborate on how swift
blame—a manifestation of system 1 thinking—can
have negative implications for managerial decision
making and organizational function.
ProblemsWith Swift Blame in Managerial Decision
Making
The first component of blame—assigning re-
sponsibility for a perceived wrongdoing—involves
a complex array of cognitive and affective processes
that can lead to inaccurate perceptions and, in con-
sequence, inappropriate decisions (Alicke, 1994).As
explained above, this is an important concern for
managers in particular because their decisions can
have far-reaching impacts on the organization and its
employees (relative to decisions by employees who
do not have such organizational influence).
Alicke (2000, p. 558) argued that swift blame pro-
cesses, which he labeled negative spontaneous
evaluations, can contribute to a blame-validation
assessment: “When a blame-validation mode is en-
gaged, observers review structural linkage evidence
in a biased manner by exaggerating the actor’s voli-
tional or causal control, by lowering their evidential
standards for blame, or by seeking information to
support their blame attribution.” Inaccuracies can
stem from the fact that blame often follows from
a morally laden judgment that occurs automatically
and unthinkingly (Alicke, 2000; Janoff-Bulman,
Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009; Lind, 2001).
Taylor (2012) argued, however, that unreflective
moral judgments can be problematic for at least three
reasons. First, they can leadpeople tomake judgments
about the wrongdoer’s essential character rather than
his or her behavior. As a result, the wrongdoer is
viewedasabadpersonasopposedtoapersonwhohas
behaved badly. This is an important distinction be-
cause the latter can be corrected with coaching and
training but the former cannot, leaving the manager
with fewer options to address the behavior (Latham,
2009). Second, moral judgments are akin to pointing
a finger at the wrongdoer, thereby removing the
blamer and other factors from responsibility for the
wrongdoing. Again, this perspective limits the man-
ager’s options for correcting the error. Third, consis-
tent with system 1 thinking, moral judgments involve
a primitive capacity that can be fraught with emotion,
biases, and distortion. According to appraisal theory,
such automatic judgments trigger affective reactions
that stimulate further efforts to interpret the situation
in an attempt to derive meaning from it (Lazarus,
1991). Such affect-driven efforts, in turn, can set into
motion a domino trail of perceptions, judgments, ac-
tions, and reactions that are fraught with the potential
for inaccuracies and even harm.
As a manifestation of system 1 thinking, swift
blame can involve any number of heuristic processes.
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Heuristics refer to cognitive shortcuts that simplify
the task of assessing probabilities and making pre-
dictions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Heuristics are
indispensable for distilling meaning from large
amounts of information. Indeed, managers could not
function effectively without them (Gigerenzer &
Todd, 1999). However, heuristics are not without
limitations. Although they accommodate quick, easy,
and convenient judgments, they can attenuate the
search for new information (Simon, 1991), leave as-
sumptions and preconceptions unchecked, and pro-
vide managers with a comforting illusion of certitude
(Griffin & Tversky, 1992). Accordingly, when de-
termining accountability, heuristics can prevent
managers from conducting a full and proper in-
vestigation that could provide themwith a fuller and
more accurate view of the mistake or perceived in-
fraction, the circumstances that led to it, the parties
involved, and potential resolutions. In short, heuris-
tics can lead managers to blame perceived wrong-
doers without complete information.
Not only can heuristics and intuitive judgments
result in incomplete information, butworse, they can
give rise to perceptions and judgments that are dis-
torted or outright wrong. A range of cognitive biases
can influence managers’ judgment. First, managers
are subject to a self-serving bias by which they are
more likely to blame negative events on others rather
than themselves, regardless of whether or not this is
appropriate (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). Second,
as argued above, managers can draw inferences
about the personality traits of employees based on
behaviors that can otherwise be explained by the
contexts in which they occur (Gilbert & Malone,
1995; Jones, 1979). This bias can lead managers to
ignore contextual information thatmay be important
in locating responsibility and administering sanc-
tions. Third, managers can be influenced by the
negativity bias, which can lead them to overestimate
the gravity of a mistake or perceived harm and react
accordingly (Rozin & Royzman, 2001), such as by
punishing an employee too severely. Finally, man-
agers’ judgments can be warped by any number of
prejudices or stereotypes (Donovan, 2007; Dovidio,
Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2010; Kerr, 1978), partic-
ularly when under time pressure (Fazio, 1990).
These and other cognitive biases can lead managers
to attribute undue levels of blame to employees who
might only be partly (or worse, not at all) responsible
for the perceived harm.
While the rationality managers deploy in assign-
ing blame is necessarily bounded (Kahneman, 2003),
their subsequent response—the decision to punish
a perceived wrongdoer—is also not a purely cogni-
tive one. Rather, it is associated with a host of nega-
tive moral emotions including anger, contempt, and
disgust (Haidt, 2003). Weiner (1995) argued that
“independent of context, responsibility is affectively
neutral, whereas blame conveys emotional negativ-
ity” (p. 14). Emotions can have an enduring effect on
punishment decisions (Andrade &Ariely, 2009). For
example, negative moral emotions can increase the
perceived severity of any particular harm. This per-
ceptual skew is problematic, as both the assignment
of responsibility and the level of sanction are posi-
tively associatedwith the perceived severity of harm
(Bradfield & Aquino, 1999). Accordingly, managers
can treat perceived wrongdoers more harshly than
might be warranted, and can choose any of a number
of informal standards by which to assess blame in-
consistently and at their whim.
Problems With Swift Blame for Organizational
Functioning
In addition to distorting managers’ perceptions
and decisions, swift blame can have at least three
downsides for effective organizational functioning.
First, employees on the receiving end of blame can
experience a host of negative emotions, including
shame, guilt, fear, and anger (Sitkin & Bies, 1994).
Such emotions tend to trigger rumination, aggres-
sion, and retaliation (Aquino, Tripp, & Bies, 2001;
Tripp & Bies, 2010), especially when the accused
perceives that the blame is unwarranted (Kulik &
Brown, 1979). For example, in the opening vignette
to this paper, City Hospital should not be surprised
that Elizabeth filed a lawsuit. Theory and research
also suggest that blame can inhibit or override com-
passion among those who make this attribution
(Lazarus, 2000), which can damage relationships
among organizational members (Atkins & Parker,
2012; Lilius et al., 2008). Being the victim of blame
can trigger defensiveness, thereby setting off
a downward spiral of incivility and interpersonal
conflict that erodes trust (Andersson & Pearson,
1999). Loss of trust, in turn, can threaten individual
and organizational performance because of the need
to expend resources to continually cover one’s back
(Dirks &Skarlicki, 2009; Zaheer,McEvily, & Perrone,
1998).
Acycle of blameand retaliation can spreadbeyond
individuals to teams and workgroups (Stuewig,
Tangney, Heigel, Harty, & McCloskey, 2010). In-
deed, if blame becomes endemic, it canweave itsway
into an organization’s culture (Arvey & Ivancevich,
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1980). The result can be a “blame culture,” charac-
terized by attitudes and norms of behavior that dis-
play a marked unwillingness to take risks or assume
responsibility for mistakes (Khatri et al., 2009).When
things go awry in a blame culture the first goal is to
find a culprit rather than constructively address the
underlying issues (Dingwall &Hillier, 2015). This can
be seen in such phenomena as “blamestorming,”
which Branwyn (1997) described as sitting around
in a group, discussing why a deadline was missed
or a project failed and identifying a scapegoat—
leading to fear, finger pointing, and hostility
among employees as well as inefficiencies for the
organization.
Not only can the negative emotions associated
with swift blame harm employees’ psychological
well-being (Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Keyes, 1995) and
quality of work life (Catino, 2009), they can also take
a toll on human resources. According to affective
events theory (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996), negative
workplace events generate unpleasant emotions,
which affect employee attitudes and behaviors.
Blame can lead to interpersonal conflict and hard
feelings (Bodtker & Jameson, 2001; Jordan & Troth,
2004). Negative feelings in theworkplace can reduce
job satisfaction (Griffeth,Hom, &Gaertner, 2000) and
increase both absenteeism (Smith & Lazarus, 1993)
and turnover (Porter & Steers, 1973)—especially
when the underlying conflict is with a supervisor
(Frone, 2000).
High turnover can be costly on its own, but espe-
cially so when it is associated with poorly managed
blame. On one hand, if poorly managed blame in-
creases firings, an organization is more likely to be
sued for wrongful dismissal. On the other hand, if
blame increases “voluntary” turnover, an organiza-
tion might still be sued for “constructive dismissal”—
that is, for fosteringa toxicworkenvironmentwhereno
reasonable person would be expected to continue
working (Vettori, 2011). Whether or not an organiza-
tion successfullydefends itself in anyparticular case, it
can incur significant costs in doing so. Either way,
unnecessary turnover directly increases recruitment
and training costs andhurtsmorale (Kerr,Koppelmeier,
& Sullivan, 1951).
A hidden cost of swift blame and the conflict it
breeds can include potential damage to the organi-
zation’s reputation as a place of work. Reputation
matters when it comes to human resource functions
such as recruitment (Cable & Graham, 2000). All
things being equal, if an organization develops
a reputation as an unfavorable place of work, it is
likely to have greater difficulty recruiting and
retaining employees. Indeed, prospective employees
might well even accept lower pay to work elsewhere
(Cable & Turban, 2003). In a competitive labor mar-
ket in which person–organization fit is increasingly
important for prospective employees and where the
best candidates have other options (Cable & Judge,
1996), it makes sense for organizations to avoid
a reputation as a place of work where swift blame is
endemic.
Swift blame can also stifle organizational learning.
As mentioned above, blame cultures tend to focus
more on identifying anddealingwith thosewhohave
committed amistake ormisdeed than constructively
addressing the underlying issues. This in turn com-
promises psychological safety, diminishing learning
and performance (Edmondson, 1999). Research in
health care (e.g., Singer et al., 2009) and aviation
(e.g., Ron, Lipshitz, & Popper, 2006) has shown that
a blame culture hinders organizations’ ability to
learn, improve, and overcome errors. This is in part
because the tendency to blame leads employees to
hide mistakes rather than openly admitting to them
and seeking assistance from others (Khatri et al.,
2009). This not only can deprive managers and em-
ployees of the opportunity to learn from their own as
well as others’mistakes or misdeeds, but it also can
deprive the organization of ideas on how its systems
might be improved.
Workplaces such as these are not conducive to the
free flow of creative ideas (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad,
2008). In such finger-pointing environments, even
when mistakes are uncovered the ensuing witch
hunt can obscure the need to address deeper un-
derlying issues. In otherwords, if aperson is to blame
for the mishap then it can be inferred that the system
itself does not require modification (Haunschild &
Sullivan, 2002; Perrow, 1984; Sagan, 1993). Such
assumptions and practices do not befit a learning
organization (Senge, 1990).
In summary, assigning responsibility and sanc-
tioning wrongdoers is a deeply ingrained human
reaction that is stimulated to greater or lesser degrees
in organizations and can even be required by the
environments in which they operate. While blame
can serve an important and indeed valuable organi-
zational function, swift blame is more likely to be
founded on biased perceptions and lead to ill-
informed decisions. As such, managers can admin-
ister blame in such a way that is far astray fromwhat
wise counsel might otherwise advise. Swift blame
not only can undermine individual well-being and
group cohesion, but it also can infiltrate organiza-
tional culture, which can generate considerable
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strain and, by extension, negatively affect the bottom
line.
ALTERNATIVES TO SWIFT BLAME
The fast pace of business might tempt organiza-
tions and managers to dismiss the downsides of
swift blame as a necessary and even unavoidable
cost of doing business. However, this need not be
the case. What then can managers do to reduce the
instinct to swiftly assign responsibility and punish
perceived wrongdoers, and to better manage blame
in the workplace? Because blame is the reflexive
product of deeply embedded cognition, dual pro-
cessing theory suggests that managers and organi-
zations would be advised to understand system 1
thinking and its potential downfalls, and to take
steps to address perceived wrongdoings in ways
that foster system 2 thinking. That is, techniques
and systems that suspend or at least delay snap
judgments—and, conversely, that increase con-
scious deliberation—offer promising alternatives to
swift blame. Because the pressures to blame stem
from organizational, legal, and psychological fac-
tors, we propose actionable strategies to address
each of these potential sources of swift blame: (a) a
no-blame approach in organizations, (b) systems of
inquiry and accountability from the theory and
practice of law, and (c) mindfulness training for
individuals. We summarize how each approach
addresses each factor in Table 1 and identify op-
portunities for future research associated with each
approach.
No-Blame Approach in Organizations
As noted above, numerous organizational factors
can contribute to swift blame, which we view as
system 1 thinking. A “no-blame” approach is one
way to foster system 2 thinking (Weick & Sutcliffe,
2011). Originally adopted by “high-reliability orga-
nizations,” where errors can be disastrous or even
fatal (e.g., emergency response units, aeronautics
firms, and health-care organizations), a no-blame
approach is characterized by a constructive attitude
toward error that shifts the focus away from identi-
fying and correcting individual mistakes or wrong-
doing to identifying and correcting systemic flaws
that contributed to the error in the first place (Vogus
& Welbourne, 2003). In short, organizations with
a no-blame approach view errors not as reasons to
discipline and punish but rather as opportunities to
learn and grow.
Weick and Sutcliffe (2011) described three key
aspects of a no-blame approach. First, managers en-
courage employees and reward them for reporting
errors (see also Provera, Montefusco, & Canato,
2010). Employees who report errors are shielded
from blame, especially if the organization avoids
adverse consequences as a result. Bywayof example,
in some health-care organizations nurses are not
penalized for certain errors provided that they report
the errors themselves within a specified period
(Taylor, 2004). Second, the reports employees gen-
erate trigger investigations and analyses into the
circumstances surrounding the mistakes and possi-
ble contributing causes. Thosewho are implicated in
an error are actively involved. Third, managers
identify subsequent actions to remedy the problem,
circulate guidelines for the prevention of similar er-
rors in the future, and consistently communicate to
employees how these steps reinforce the organiza-
tion’s objectives (Roberts, Bea, & Bartles, 2001).
A no-blame approach reduces swift blame by al-
tering the organizational culture away from the ten-
dency to blame toward one of striving to learn how
mistakes occur. Although a no-blame approach can
TABLE 1
Summary of HowEach Perspective Addresses the Factors
That Motivate Swift Blame
Motivation for
swift blame Perspective
Organizational
factors
No-blame approach
c Job requirements Reduces theperceivedneed for swift blame
by formally requiring that mistakes and
perceived harms be studied and
addressed in a fundamentally different
way. The goal is to learn about system
errors by studying mistakes to prevent
them and other errors from occurring in
the future.
c Formal policies
c Codes of conduct
c Performance
pressures
Legal factors Legal systems of inquiry
c Laws and
regulations
Do not change legal duties per se, but can
help ensure that violations of normative
standards are managed in a more
thoughtful, less biased manner. Help
increase procedural and restorative
justice.
c Normative
standards
Psychological
factors
Mindfulness training
c Positive self-
concept
Diminishes the need to bolster self-concept
by enhancing self-esteem and core self-
evaluations. Reduces defensiveness and
emotional reactivity. Attenuates
retaliation to perceived injustice.
c Emotion
regulation
c Fairness concerns
c Sense of agency
2017 229Skarlicki, Kay, Aquino, and Fushtey
have benefits, it is not without limitations. For ex-
ample, a no-blame approach can require significant
resources to implement in terms of added time for
teams to collectively make sense of errors (Reason,
1997). Also, even in high-reliability organizations
with adequate resources, in certain instances blam-
ing individuals for their mistakes might be
appropriate—such as when specific individuals ex-
hibit particularly egregious behaviors within an al-
readywell-defined system.Ano-blame environment
does not endorse the notion that all mistakes are
permitted as long as they are declared (Catino, 2008).
For example, it would not necessarily be appropriate
to absolve a hospital worker of responsibility for
negligent disregard of hand sanitization rules after
years of intensive efforts to improve hand sanitiza-
tion policies, procedures, and resources (Wachter &
Pronovost, 2009). A certain tension always exists
between improving the quality of the system and
upholding standards of behavior of the individuals
within that system (Walton, 2004). Thus, a no-blame
approach might not be appropriate in all contexts.
In terms of future research, we propose that a no-
blame approach can be adapted and applied to
a wider range of organizational settings than is cur-
rently the case. Although managers might not view
their organizations as functioning in a high-
reliability context, factors such as the increased
pace of work, the goal of providing an error-free
product or service, and the enhanced role of social
media in disciplining organizations all conspire to
create conditions where errors can affect an organi-
zation’s success and even threaten its survival.
Hence, under these conditions, a no-blame approach
could be more important than ever to effective
management.
A second avenue for future research would be the
efficacy of managers applying a no-blame approach
to units within their organizations where mistakes
occur frequently or are especially costly. For exam-
ple, in light of the $50millionpackagedmeat recall at
Maple Leaf Foods in 2008 (Greenberg & Elliott, 2009),
meat-packaging companies might consider applying
a no-blame approach to quality control operations. A
no-blame approach might not be required for other
parts of an organization with less potential for disaster,
such as office administration.
Systems of Inquiry and Accountability From the
Theory and Practice of Law
In terms of addressing the tendency to engage in
swift blame to satisfy legal requirements, we propose
that system 2 thinking can be fostered via legal
systems of inquiry and accountability when per-
ceived wrongdoing occurs. Systems of inquiry and
accountability are guidelines and principles that
can help managers systematically assign re-
sponsibility and determine appropriate sanctions
(e.g., Leventhal, 1980). This perspective is intended
to give people a fair hearing before blame is allo-
cated, and hence can slow down the blaming pro-
cess by systematically considering criteria that
contribute to a person’s being held accountable for
a wrongdoing. Such principles and practices have
been developed and refined in legal systems over
time, in part to encourage greater analysis and de-
liberation of the issues at play.
Assessing responsibility for amistake or perceived
harm can be improved, for instance, by establishing
guidelines founded in the law of tort and negligence
(Osborne, 2015). Such systems of inquiry consider
whether or not a perceived wrongdoer should be
deemed blameworthy in the first place, and can in-
clude the following actionable considerations:
• Foreseeability: Was the mistake or harm a reason-
ably foreseeable result of the actions (or omis-
sions) of the perceived wrongdoer?
• Caution: Did the perceived wrongdoer exer-
cise the reasonable caution that a prudent per-
son would have exercised under similar
circumstances?
• Causation: But for the actions (or omissions) of the
perceived wrongdoer, would the mistake or harm
have occurred in any event?
• Contribution: Did another party (including the
aggrieved) contribute to the mistake or harm in
such a way that it was a reasonably foreseeable
result of his or her actions (or omissions)?
• Defenses: Are there any reasonable grounds on
which to excuse the actions (or omissions) of the
perceived wrongdoer? For example, were the
impugned actions (or omissions) necessary for
some important and legitimate reason?
Wepropose, however, that caremust be taken from
the outset to examine the legal implications of the
mistake or perceived harm itself. For example, while
an infringement of an organization’s internal rules
(e.g., dress code violations, tardiness, improper ex-
pense submissions, etc.) should initiate an in-
vestigation by managers themselves, violations of
public laws and/or regulations (e.g., physical assault,
environmental despoliation, securities fraud, etc.)
might trigger the need to alert and consult relevant
public authorities or regulatory agencies. The more
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a mistake or perceived harm implicates statutory or
regulatory requirements, the more constrained
managers are in deploying their internal systems of
inquiry, and the more they will have to adhere to
external regulatory systems.
Once managers determine that an employee is
blameworthy, they then need to decide on an ap-
propriate remedy. We propose that managers can
draw on the purposes and principles of sentencing
from criminal law. While these can vary by juris-
diction, it is widely accepted that the goals of sen-
tencing include (a) denunciation, (b) deterrence,
(c) protection of society, (d) rehabilitation, and
(e) reparation (Ruby, Chan, & Hasan, 2012). The
remedial measures managers apply to employees
whom they have deemed blameworthy should
serve similar purposes. That is, a remedial measure
should seek to (a) denounce the mistake or in-
fraction as contrary to the organization’s values and
policies; (b) deter employees from making similar
mistakes or violations in the future; (c) protect other
employees, the organization, and indeed society at
large from the consequences of similar mistakes or
infractions in the future; (d) help employees re-
cover from their mistakes or misdeeds and avoid
future violations; and (e) encourage employees to
repair, to the extent possible, the damage they have
caused.
In addition to such considerations, we propose
thatmanagers can apply keyprinciples of sentencing
adopted by advanced criminal legal systems (Ruby
et al., 2012), adapted to an employment context.
These include the following:
• Proportionality: A remedy should be pro-
portionate to the gravity of the mistake or in-
fraction, as well as the degree of responsibility of
the wrongdoer.
• Parity: A remedy should be similar to other mea-
sures taken for similar mistakes or infractions
made by others under similar circumstances.
• Step-up: A remedy should be more serious than
previousmeasures given to the same employee for
the same or a substantially similar mistake or
infraction.
• Restraint: Any and all alternatives to dismissal
that are reasonable under the circumstances
should be considered. Dismissal should be an
option of last resort.
• Intentionality: A remedy should be less severe if
the mistake or violation was committed un-
intentionally and more severe if it was deliberate.
• Breach of trust: A remedy should bemore severe if
the employeewas in a special position of power or
trust within the organization.
• Training: If the mistake or infraction was attrib-
utable to ignorance, substance abuse, or mental
health issues, the remedy should involve appro-
priate training, counseling, or treatment to miti-
gate the risk that the same mistake will be
repeated.
• Mitigating factors: If the employee (a) accepted
responsibility through word or deed, (b) demon-
strated meaningful insight into the mistake or
wrongdoing, and/or (c) expressed an attitude of
genuine contrition or remorse, the remedy should
be less severe.
In terms of future research, we propose that these
steps are likely to result in higher perceived fairness
not only among those accused, but also among
third-party observers, such as the co-workers of the
accused party. Future research might identify
which of these steps explains the most variance in
fairness perceptions among the accused and third
parties. We also propose that the more serious the
mistake or infraction, the more managers are likely
to resort to swift blame as a way to deal with a per-
ceived infraction. This is because larger threats tend
to trigger a stronger fight or flight response
(Kahneman, 2011). Moreover, the more serious the
potential consequences to the employee, the more
earnestly managers should take such consider-
ations into account.
A straightforward way for organizations to en-
courage their managers to do so might be to create
a checklist with the aforementioned considerations
to ensure that managers more systematically con-
sider a perceived wrongdoing from multiple per-
spectives before ascribing responsibility. If it is
determined that sanctions are warranted, organiza-
tions could ask their managers to respond to a series
of open-ended questions adopted from the princi-
ples of sentencing to encourage a deliberate, rea-
soned, transparent, and well-balanced response.
Such a system would not only slow down swift
blame, but it would also create a paper trail that—
should a dispute go to the courts—evidences
a decision-making process that reflects the same
considerations the courts themselves use in their own
deliberations. These processes are also likely to en-
hance employee perceptions of procedural justice
and assure employees that their mistakes will not be
judged hastily and that their rights will be protected.
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Mindfulness Training for Individuals
A way to address the psychological factors un-
derlying swift blame, foster system 2 thinking, and
encourage more thoughtful responses to workplace
errors is to consider mindfulness training for man-
agers and employees (for a review, see Kay &
Skarlicki, 2017). Mindfulness is the self-regulation
of attention on present-moment experience with an
open, curious, and accepting attitude (Bishop et al.,
2004). Research shows that organizations and their
employees can avail themselves of the benefits of
mindfulness through training (e.g., Hu¨lsheger,
Alberts, Feinholdt, & Lang, 2013) as well as em-
ployee selection (Reb, Narayanan, & Chaturvedi,
2014).
Empirical research highlights a number of rea-
sons why mindfulness training is likely to buffer
managers from the perils of swift blame. First,
mindfulness is positively associated with self-
esteem (Randal, Pratt, & Bucci, 2015), favorable
core self-evaluations (Kong, Wang, & Zhao, 2014),
and psychological well-being, which entails
a healthy measure of self-acceptance (Brown &
Ryan, 2003; Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007). Ac-
cordingly, to the extent that swift blame can be
triggered by the need to preserve or enhance man-
agers’ self-concept, mindfulness and the positive
self-concept associated with it might serve to at-
tenuate the inclination to engage in swift blame
from the outset.
Second, mindfulness has broadly beneficial ef-
fects on one’s emotional experience. This is impor-
tant because, as explained above, blame is often
associated with and preceded by anger (Weiner,
1986). Mindfulness dampens the onset of emotions
and shortens the time they take to run their course
(Williams, 2010). Researchers have found that
mindfulness training stimulatesneurological changes
that can help managers better deal with emotions
under stress (Davidson et al., 2003). Even short pe-
riods of mindfulness training have been shown to
result in less affective reactivity and emotional vola-
tility (Arch & Craske, 2006). Accordingly, mindful-
ness training could be helpful in managing the
affectiveandemotional reactions thatcan lead toswift
blame.
Third, mindfulness also has the potential to re-
duce some of the cognitive biases that characterize
swift blame. For example, trait mindfulness has
been associated with less susceptibility to the im-
pact bias, which is the tendency to overestimate
the emotional impact of a future event (Emanuel,
Updegraff, Kalmbach, & Ciesla, 2010). Mindful-
ness training can also reduce the negativity bias,
defined as the tendency to givemore psychological
weight to negative than positive experiences
(Kiken & Shook, 2011). Therefore, mindfulness
has the potential to help managers avoid over-
estimating the gravity of a mistake or perceived
harm and reacting accordingly. Mindfulness-
based training can also reduce in-group bias
(Kang, Gray, & Dovidio, 2014; Tincher, Lebois, &
Barsalou, 2016), which is the tendency to exhibit
favoritism toward members of one’s in-group. Ac-
cordingly, mindfulness might help buffer man-
agers from the us-versus-them mentality that can
arise when blame threatens to escalate from the
individual to the group level.
Fourth, mindfulness training can help reduce or
soften swift blame by stimulating emotions and
behaviors that nurture healthy interpersonal re-
lationships. A large body of evidence shows that
mindfulness is especially helpful for improving
relationship quality (Karremans, Schellekens, &
Kappen, 2015). Trait mindfulness, for example,
is associated with empathy (Creswell, Way,
Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 2007), which in turn is
linked to relationship satisfaction (Davis &
Oathout, 1987). Mindfulness training has also
been shown to result in more compassionate
(Condon, Desbordes, Miller, & DeSteno, 2013) and
altruistic responses to others’ suffering (Weng
et al., 2013). Accordingly, mindfulness has
been associated with helpfulness (Weng, Fox,
Hessenthaler, Stodola, & Davidson, 2015), such
as through interpersonal organizational citizen-
ship behaviors (Reb et al., 2014). Mindfulness
further reduces defensiveness and aggression
(Heppner et al., 2008) as well as retaliation for
perceived injustice (Long&Christian, 2015). As such,
mindfulness has been negatively associated with
punishing others (Weng et al., 2015) and counter-
productive workplace behaviors (Krishnakumar &
Robinson, 2015).
Given the growing evidence of the psychologi-
cally beneficial implications of mindfulness, future
research needs to explore not only whether mind-
fulness lessens the impulse to engage in swift blame
and the emotions it entails, but also whether
mindfulness helps stem the reactive behaviors that
can escalate the conflict that blame can provoke.
Specifically, future research needs to explore
whether and how (i.e., through what mechanisms)
mindfulness reduces the tendency to engage in
swift blame.
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CONCLUSIONS
Evolution has ingrained into human behavior the
instinct for swift blame—for hastily assigning re-
sponsibility and sanctioning wrongdoers when
things go wrong. This tendency can have consider-
able downsides for organizations and their em-
ployees. Our goal in this paper has been to argue that
a more thoughtful approach to addressing mistakes
and perceived wrongdoings can be achieved by
harnessing techniques and systems designed to slow
down swift blame and potentially foster higher
quality responses at the organizational, legal, and
psychological levels. These include a no-blame ap-
proach, systems of inquiry and accountability, and
mindfulness training. We have identified future re-
search opportunities relevant to each of these ap-
proaches and called for research not only to test the
efficacy of these interventions in reducing swift
blame, but also to (a) determine the conditions under
which these approaches will or will not work and
(b) explore the mechanisms that can explain how
and why they work. Our list of approaches to reduce
swift blame is intended to be illustrative rather than
complete. We encourage researchers to explore,
and managers to consider, these and other ap-
proaches to administering blamemore deliberately
and constructively.
REFERENCES
Alicke, M. D. (1994). Evidential and extra-evidential
evaluations of social conduct. Journal of Social Be-
havior and Personality, 9(4), 591–615.
Alicke, M. D. (2000). Culpable control and the psychology
of blame. Psychological Bulletin, 126(4), 556–574.
Alicke, M. D., & Davis, T. L. (1989). The role of a posteriori
victim information in judgments of blame and sanc-
tion. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
25(4), 362–377.
Alicke, M. D., Davis, T. L., & Pezzo, M. V. (1994). A pos-
teriori adjustment of a priori decision criteria. Social
Cognition, 12(4), 281–308.
Andersson, L. M., & Pearson, C. M. (1999). Tit for tat? The
spiraling effect of incivility in the workplace. Acad-
emy of Management Review, 24(3), 452–471.
Andrade, E. B., &Ariely, D. (2009). The enduring impact of
transient emotions on decision making. Organiza-
tional Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
109(1), 1–8.
Aquino, K., Tripp, T. M., & Bies, R. J. (2001). How em-
ployees respond to personal offense: The effects of
blameattribution, victimstatus, andoffender status on
revenge and reconciliation in the workplace. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 86(1), 52–59.
Arch, J. J., & Craske, M. G. (2006). Mechanisms of mind-
fulness: Emotion regulation following a focused
breathing induction. Behaviour Research and Ther-
apy, 44(12), 1849–1858.
Arvey, R. D., & Ivancevich, J. M. (1980). Punishment in
organizations: A review, propositions, and research
suggestions. Academy of Management Review, 5(1),
123–132.
Ask, K., Granhag, P. A., & Rebelius, A. (2011). Investigators
under influence:Howsocial normsactivate goal‐directed
processing of criminal evidence. Applied Cognitive Psy-
chology, 25(4), 548–553.
Atkins, P. W., & Parker, S. K. (2012). Understanding indi-
vidual compassion in organizations: The role of ap-
praisals and psychological flexibility. Academy of
Management Review, 37(4), 524–546.
Baas, M., De Dreu, C. K., & Nijstad, B. A. (2008). A meta-
analysis of 25 years of mood-creativity research:
Hedonic tone, activation, or regulatory focus? Psy-
chological Bulletin, 134(6), 779–806.
Baron, J., & Hershey, J. C. (1988). Outcome bias in decision
evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 54(4), 569–579.
Bell, N. E., & Tetlock, P. E. (1989). The intuitive politician
and the assignment of blame in organizations. In
R. A. Giacalone & P. Rosenfeld (Eds.), Impression man-
agement in the organization (pp. 105–123). Hillsdale,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Berg, K. S., & Vidmar, N. (1975). Authoritarianism and re-
call of evidence about criminal behavior. Journal of
Research in Personality, 9(2), 147–157.
Bishop, S. R., et al. (2004). Mindfulness: A proposed op-
erational definition. Clinical Psychology: Science and
Practice, 11(3), 230–241.
Bodtker, A.M., & Jameson, J. K. (2001). Emotion in conflict
formation and its transformation: Application to or-
ganizational conflict management. International
Journal of Conflict Management, 12(3), 259–275.
Bradfield, M., & Aquino, K. (1999). The effects of blame
attributions and offender likableness on forgiveness
and revenge in the workplace. Journal of Manage-
ment, 25(5), 607–631.
Branwyn, G. (1997). Jargon watch. San Francisco: Conde´
Nast Publications, Inc.
Brickman, P., Ryan, K., & Wortman, C. B. (1975). Causal
chains: Attribution of responsibility as a function of
immediate and prior causes. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 32(6), 1060–1067.
Brown, K. W., & Ryan, R. M. (2003). The benefits of being
present: Mindfulness and its role in psychological
2017 233Skarlicki, Kay, Aquino, and Fushtey
well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 84(4), 822–848.
Brown, K. W., Ryan, R. M., & Creswell, J. D. (2007). Mind-
fulness: Theoretical foundations and evidence for
its salutary effects. Psychological Inquiry, 18(4),
211–237.
Butterfield, K. D., Trevino, L. K., & Ball, G. A. (1996).
Punishment from the manager’s perspective: A
grounded investigation and inductive model. Acad-
emy of Management Journal, 39(6), 1479–1512.
Cable, D. M., & Graham, M. E. (2000). The determinants of
job seekers’ reputation perceptions. Journal of Orga-
nizational Behavior, 21(8), 929–947.
Cable, D.M., & Judge, T. A. (1996). Person–organization fit,
job choice decisions, and organizational entry. Orga-
nizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
67(3), 294–311.
Cable, D. M., & Turban, D. B. (2003). The value of organi-
zational reputation in the recruitment context: A
brand‐equity perspective. Journal of Applied Social
Psychology, 33(11), 2244–2266.
Campbell,W., & Sedikides, C. (1999). Self-threatmagnifies
the self-serving bias: A meta-analytic integration. Re-
view of General Psychology, 3(1), 23–43.
Carlsmith, K. M., Darley, J. M., & Robinson, P. H. (2002).
Why do we punish? Deterrence and just deserts as
motives for punishment. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 83(2), 284–299.
Catino, M. (2008). A review of literature: Individual blame
vs. organizational function logics in accident analysis.
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management,
16(1), 53–62.
Catino, M. (2009). Blame culture and defensive medicine.
Cognition Technology and Work, 11(4), 245–253.
Condon, P., Desbordes, G., Miller, W. B., & DeSteno, D.
(2013). Meditation increases compassionate re-
sponses to suffering. Psychological Science, 24(10),
2125–2127.
Cooley, C. H. (1964). Human nature and the social order.
New York: Scribner’s.
Crant, J. M., & Bateman, T. S. (1993). Assignment of credit
and blame for performance outcomes. Academy of
Management Journal, 36(1), 7–27.
Creswell, J. D.,Way, B.M., Eisenberger, N. I., & Lieberman,
M. D. (2007). Neural correlates of dispositional
mindfulness during affect labeling. Psychosomatic
Medicine, 69(6), 560–565.
Crocker, J., & Park, L. E. (2004). The costly pursuit of self-
esteem. Psychological Bulletin, 130(3), 392–414.
Davidson, R. J., et al. (2003). Alterations in brain and im-
mune function produced by mindfulness meditation.
Psychosomatic Medicine, 65(4), 564–570.
Davis, M. H., & Oathout, H. A. (1987). Maintenance of sat-
isfaction in romantic relationships: Empathy and re-
lational competence. Journal of Personality andSocial
Psychology, 53(2), 397–410.
Dingwall, G., & Hillier, T. (2015). Blamestorming, blame-
mongers and scapegoats: Allocating blame in the
criminal justice process. Bristol, UK: Policy Press.
Dirks, K. T., & Skarlicki, D. P. (2009). The relationship be-
tween being perceived as trustworthy by coworkers
and individual performance. Journal of Management,
7, 21–40.
Donovan, R. A. (2007). To blame or not to blame: In-
fluences of target race and observer sex on rape blame
attribution. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 22(6),
722–736.
Dovidio, J. F., Hewstone, M., Glick, P., & Esses, V. M.
(2010). Prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination:
Theoretical and empirical overview. In J. F. Dovidio,
M. Hewstone, P. Glick, & V. M. Esses (Eds.), Sage
handbook of prejudice, stereotyping and discrim-
ination (pp. 3–29). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
Edmondson, A. (1999). Psychological safety and learning
behavior in work teams. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 44(2), 350–383.
Efran, M. G. (1974). The effect of physical appearance on
the judgment of guilt, interpersonal attraction, and
severity of recommended punishment in a simulated
jury task. Journal of Research in Personality, 8(1),
45–54.
Emanuel, A. S., Updegraff, J. A., Kalmbach, D. A., & Ciesla,
J. A. (2010). The role of mindfulness facets in affective
forecasting. Personality and Individual Differences,
49(7), 815–818.
England, G. (2008). Individual employment law. Toronto:
Irwin Law.
Esnard, C., & Dumas, R. (2013). Perceptions of male victim
blame in a child sexual abuse case: Effects of gender,
age and need for closure. Psychology, Crime & Law,
19(9), 817–844.
Fazio, R. H. (1990). Multiple processes by which attitudes
guide behavior: The MODE model as an integrative
framework. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in exper-
imental and social psychology (pp. 75–109). San
Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison pro-
cesses. Human Relations, 7(2), 117–140.
Fincham, F. D., & Shultz, T. R. (1981). Intervening causa-
tion and the mitigation of responsibility for harm.
British Journal of Social Psychology, 20(2), 113–120.
Frone, M. R. (2000). Work–family conflict and employee
psychiatric disorders: The national comorbidity
234 AugustAcademy of Management Perspectives
survey. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85(6),
888–895.
Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (1999). Fast and frugal heu-
ristics: The adaptive toolbox. In G. Gigerenzer &
P. M. Todd (Eds.), Simple heuristics that make us
smart (pp. 3–34). Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.
Gilbert, D. T., & Malone, P. S. (1995). The correspondence
bias. Psychological Bulletin, 117(1), 21–38.
Greenberg, J., & Elliott, C. (2009). A cold cut crisis: Lis-
teriosis, Maple Leaf Foods, and the politics of apol-
ogy. Canadian Journal of Communication, 34(2),
189–204.
Griffeth, R. W., Hom, P. W., & Gaertner, S. (2000). A meta-
analysis of antecedents and correlates of employee
turnover: Update, moderator tests, and research im-
plications for the next millennium. Journal of Man-
agement, 26(3), 463–488.
Griffin, D., & Tversky, A. (1992). The weighing of evidence
and the determinants of confidence. Cognitive Psy-
chology, 24(3), 411–435.
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A
social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psy-
chological Review, 108(4), 814–834.
Haidt, J. (2003). The moral emotions. In R. J. Davidson,
K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), Handbook of
affective sciences (pp. 852–870). Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Hamilton, V. L. (1978). Who is responsible? Toward a so-
cial psychology of responsibility attribution. Social
Psychology, 41(4), 316–328.
Hamilton, V. L. (1980). Intuitive psychologist or intuitive
lawyer? Alternative models of the attribution process.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39(5),
767–772.
Haunschild, P. R., & Sullivan, B. N. (2002). Learning from
complexity: Effects of prior accidents and incidents on
airlines’ learning. Administrative Science Quarterly,
47(4), 609–643.
Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal re-
lations. New York: Wiley.
Heppner, W. L., et al. (2008). Mindfulness as a means of
reducing aggressive behavior: Dispositional and
situational evidence. Aggressive Behavior, 34(5),
486–496.
Hu¨lsheger, U. R., Alberts, H. J., Feinholdt, A., & Lang, J. W.
(2013). Benefits of mindfulness at work: The role of
mindfulness in emotion regulation, emotional ex-
haustion, and job satisfaction. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 98(2), 310–325.
Janoff-Bulman, R., Sheikh, S., & Hepp, S. (2009). Pro-
scriptive versus prescriptive morality: Two faces of
moral regulation. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 96(3), 521–537.
Johnson, J. T.,Ogawa,K.H., Delforge,A., &Early, D. (1989).
Causal primacy and comparative fault: The effect of
position in a causal chain on judgments of legal re-
sponsibility. Personality and Social Psychology Bul-
letin, 15(2), 161–174.
Jones, E. E. (1979). The rocky road from acts to disposi-
tions. American Psychologist, 34(2), 107–117.
Jordan, P. J., &Troth,A. C. (2004).Managing emotions during
team problem solving: Emotional intelligence and con-
flict resolution.Human Performance, 17(2), 195–218.
Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and
choice: Mapping bounded rationality. American Psy-
chologist, 58(9), 697–720.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Kahneman, D. (2013). Behavioral economics and investor
protection: Keynote address. Loyola University Chi-
cago Law Journal, 44, 1333–1341.
Kang, Y., Gray, J. R., & Dovidio, J. F. (2014). The non-
discriminating heart: Loving kindness meditation
training decreases implicit intergroup bias. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(3),
1306–1314.
Karlovac, M., & Darley, J. M. (1988). Attribution of re-
sponsibility for accidents: A negligence law analogy.
Social Cognition, 6(4), 287–318.
Karremans, J. C., Schellekens, M. P., & Kappen, G. (2015).
Bridging the sciences of mindfulness and romantic re-
lationships: A theoretical model and research agenda.
Personality and Social PsychologyReview, 21(1), 1–21.
Kay, A., & Skarlicki, D. P. (2017). Mindfulness at work.
In R. Griffin (Ed.), Oxford bibliographies in man-
agement. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution theory in social psychol-
ogy. In D. Levine (Ed.), Nebraska symposium on mo-
tivation (Vol. 15, pp. 192–238). Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press.
Kelley, H. H. (1972). Attribution in social interaction. In
E. E. Jones, D. E. Kanouse, H. H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett,
S. Valins & B. Weiner (Eds.), Attribution: Perceiving
the causes of behavior (pp. 1–26). Morristown, NJ:
General Learning Press.
Kelsen, H. J. (1943). Society and nature. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press.
Kerr, N. L. (1978). Severity of prescribed penalty andmock
jurors’ verdicts. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 36(12), 1431–1442.
Kerr, W. A., Koppelmeier, G. J., & Sullivan, J. J. (1951).
Absenteeism, turnover and morale in a metals fabri-
cation factory. Occupational Psychology, 25, 50–55.
2017 235Skarlicki, Kay, Aquino, and Fushtey
Khatri, N., Brown,G.D., &Hicks, L. L. (2009). Fromablame
culture to a just culture in health care. Health Care
Management Review, 34(4), 312–322.
Kiken, L. G., & Shook, N. J. (2011). Looking up: Mind-
fulness increases positive judgments and reduces
negativity bias. Social Psychological & Personality
Science, 2(4), 425–431.
Knobe, J. (2003). Intentional action in folk psychology: An
experimental investigation. Philosophical Psychol-
ogy, 16(2), 309–324.
Kong, F., Wang, X., & Zhao, J. (2014). Dispositional mind-
fulness and life satisfaction: The role of core self-
evaluations. Personality and Individual Differences,
56, 165–169.
Krishnakumar, S., & Robinson, M. D. (2015). Maintaining
an even keel: An affect-mediated model of mindful-
ness and hostile work behavior. Emotion, 15(5),
579–589.
Kulik, J. A., & Brown, R. (1979). Frustration, attribution of
blame, and aggression. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 15(2), 183–194.
Lagnado, D. A., & Channon, S. (2008). Judgments of cause
and blame: The effects of intentionality and fore-
seeability. Cognition, 108(3), 754–770.
Landy, D., & Aronson, E. (1969). The influence of the
character of the criminal and his victim on the de-
cisions of simulated jurors. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, 5(2), 141–152.
Latham, G. P. (2009). Becoming the evidenced-based
manager. Boston: Davis-Black.
Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Progress on a cognitive-motivational-
relational theory of emotion. American Psychologist,
46(8), 819–834.
Lazarus, R. S. (2000). Cognitive-motivational-relational
theory of emotion. In Y. L. Hanin (Ed.), Emotions in
sport (pp. 39–63). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.
Lerner, J. S., Goldberg, J. H., & Tetlock, P. E. (1998). Sober
second thought: The effects of accountability, anger,
and authoritarianism on attributions of responsibility.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24(6),
563–574.
Lerner, M. J. (1971). Observer’s evaluation of a victim:
Justice, guilt, and veridical perception. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 20(2), 127–135.
Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief in a just world: A funda-
mental delusion. New York: Plenum Press.
Leventhal, G. S. (1980). What should be done with equity
theory? In K. J. Gergen, M. S. Greenberg, & R. H.Willis
(Eds.), Social exchange: Advances in theory and re-
search (pp. 27–55). New York: Plenum.
Lilius, J.M.,Worline,M.C.,Maitlis, S., Kanov, J., Dutton, J. E.,
& Frost, P. (2008). The contours and consequences of
compassion at work. Journal of Organizational Behav-
ior, 29(2), 193–218.
Lin, N., Cook, K. S., & Burt, R. S. (2001). Social capital:
Theory and research. New Brunswick, NJ: Trans-
action Publishers.
Lind, E. A. (2001). Fairness heuristic theory: Justice judg-
ments as pivotal cognitions in organizational re-
lations. In J. Greenberg & R. Cropanzano (Eds.),
Advances in organizational justice (pp. 56–88). Stan-
ford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Long, E. C., & Christian, M. S. (2015). Mindfulness buffers
retaliatory responses to injustice: A regulatory ap-
proach. Journal of Applied Psychology, 100(5),
1409–1422.
Maselli, M. D., & Altrocchi, J. (1969). Attribution of intent.
Psychological Bulletin, 71(6), 445–454.
Meyerson, D., Weick, K. E., & Kramer, R. M. (1996). Swift
trust and temporary groups. In R. M. Kramer &
T. R. Tyler (Eds.), Trust in organizations: Frontiers of
theory and research (pp. 166–195). Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.
Mikula,G. (2003). Testing an attribution‐of‐blamemodel of
judgments of injustice. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 33(6), 793–811.
Nemeth, C., & Sosis, R. H. (1973). A simulated jury study:
Characteristics of thedefendant and the jurors. Journal
of Social Psychology, 90(2), 221–229.
O’Reilly, C. A., III, & Weitz, B. A. (1980). Managing
marginal employees: The use of warnings and dis-
missals. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25(3),
467–484.
Osborne, P. H. (2015).The lawof torts. Toronto: Irwin Law.
Perrow, C. (1984).Normal accidents: Living with high-risk
technologies. New York: Basic Books.
Porter, L. W., & Steers, R. M. (1973). Organizational, work,
and personal factors in employee turnover and ab-
senteeism. Psychological Bulletin, 80(2), 151–176.
Provera, B., Montefusco, A., & Canato, A. (2010). A “no
blame” approach to organizational learning. British
Journal of Management, 21, 1057–1074.
Randal, C., Pratt, D., & Bucci, S. (2015). Mindfulness and
self-esteem: A systematic review. Mindfulness, 6,
1366–1378.
Reason, J. (1997). Managing the risks of organizational
accidents. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Reb, J., Narayanan, J., & Chaturvedi, S. (2014). Leading
mindfully: Two studies on the influence of supervisor
trait mindfulness on employee well-being and per-
formance.Mindfulness, 5(1), 36–45.
Rhoades, L., Eisenberger, R., & Armeli, S. (2001). Affective
commitment to the organization: The contribution of
236 AugustAcademy of Management Perspectives
perceived organizational support. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 86(5), 825–836.
Roberts, K. H., Bea, R., & Bartles, D. L. (2001). Must acci-
dents happen? Lessons from high-reliability organi-
zations. Academy of Management Executive, 15(3),
70–78.
Ron, N., Lipshitz, R., & Popper, M. (2006). How orga-
nizations learn: Post-flight reviews in an F-16
fighter squadron. Organization Studies, 27(8),
1069–1089.
Rozin, P., & Royzman, E. B. (2001). Negativity bias, nega-
tivity dominance, and contagion. Personality and
Social Psychology Review, 5(4), 296–320.
Ruby, C., Chan, G. J., & Hasan, N. R. (2012). Sentencing.
Markham, Canada: LexisNexis.
Ryff, C. D. (1989). Happiness is everything, or is it? Ex-
plorations on themeaning of psychological well-being.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57(6),
1069–1081.
Ryff, C. D., & Keyes, C. L. M. (1995). The structure of psy-
chological well-being revisited. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 69(4), 719–727.
Sagan, C. (1993). Speaking out. Science, 260(5116), 1861.
Schein, E. H. (2010). Organizational culture and leader-
ship (Vol. 2). San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons.
Senge, P. (1990).The fifthdiscipline: Theart and scienceof
the learning organization. New York: Currency
Doubleday.
Shaver, K. G. (2012). Entrepreneurial action: Conceptual
foundations and research challenges. In A. C. Corbett &
J. A. Katz (Eds.), Entrepreneurial action: Advances in
entrepreneurship, firm emergence and growth (pp.
281–306). Bingley, UK: Emerald Group.
Shultz, T. R., Schleifer, M., & Altman, I. (1981). Judgments
of causation, responsibility, and punishment in cases
of harm-doing. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Sci-
ence, 13(3), 238–253.
Sigall, H., & Ostrove, N. (1975). Beautiful but dangerous:
Effects of offender attractiveness and nature of the
crime on juridic judgment. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 31(3), 410–414.
Simon, H. A. (1991). Bounded rationality and organi-
zational learning. Organization Science, 2(1),
125–134.
Singer, S. J., et al. (2009). Identifying organizational cul-
tures that promote patient safety. Health Care Man-
agement Review, 34(4), 300–311.
Sitarz, D. (1993). Agenda 21: The earth summit strategy to
save our planet. Boulder, CO: Earthpress.
Sitkin, S.B., &Bies, R. J. (1994).The legalistic organization.
San Francisco: Sage Publications.
Smith, A. H. (2013). Moral blame and moral protest. In
D. J. Coates&N.A.Tognazzini (Eds.),Blame: Its nature
and norms (pp. 27–49). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Smith, C. A., & Lazarus, R. S. (1993). Appraisal compo-
nents, core relational themes, and the emotions. Cog-
nition and Emotion, 7(3-4), 233–269.
Snyder, C. R., & Higgins, R. L. (1988). Excuses: Their ef-
fective role in the negotiation of reality. Psychological
Bulletin, 104(1), 23–35.
Sosis, R. H. (1974). Internal-external control and the per-
ception of responsibility of another for an accident.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30(3),
393–399.
Stuewig, J.,Tangney, J. P.,Heigel,C.,Harty, L.,&McCloskey,
L. A. (2010). Shaming, blaming, and maiming: Func-
tional links among themoral emotions, externalization
of blame, and aggression. Journal of Research in Per-
sonality, 44, 91–102.
Taylor, C. (2012). Moralism: A study of a vice. New York:
Routledge.
Taylor, K. D. (2004). Reviews of books, videos, CDs, au-
diotapes, web sites, and more, written by emergency
nurses. Journal of Emergency Nursing: JEN, 30(2),
172–173.
Tincher, M. M., Lebois, L. A. M., & Barsalou, L. W. (2016).
Mindful attention reduces linguistic intergroup bias.
Mindfulness, 7, 349–360.
Tripp, T. M., & Bies, R. J. (2010). “Righteous” anger and
revenge in the workplace: The fantasies, the feuds, the
forgiveness. InM. Potegal, G. Stemmler, &C. Spielberger
(Eds.), International handbook of anger (pp. 413–431).
New York: Springer.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under un-
certainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4),
1124–1131.
Vettori, S. (2011). Constructive dismissal and repudiation
of contract: What must be proved. Stellenbosch Law
Review, 22, 173–179.
Vogus, T. J., & Welbourne, T. M. (2003). Structuring for
high reliability:HRpractices andmindful processes in
reliability‐seeking organizations. Journal of Organi-
zational Behavior, 24(7), 877–903.
Wachter, R. M., & Pronovost, P. J. (2009). Balancing
“no blame” with accountability in patient safety.
The New England Journal of Medicine, 361(14),
1401–1406.
Walton,M. (2004). Creating a “no blame” culture: Havewe
got the balance right?Quality & Safety in Health Care,
13(3), 163–164.
Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society. Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press.
2017 237Skarlicki, Kay, Aquino, and Fushtey
Weick, K. E., & Sutcliffe, K. M. (2011). Managing the un-
expected: Assuring high performance in an age of
complexity. New York: Wiley.
Weiner, B. (1986). An attributional theory of achievement
motivation and emotion. New York: Springer.
Weiner, B. (1995). Judgments of responsibility: A founda-
tion for a theory of social conduct. NewYork: Guilford
Press.
Weiner, B. (2010). The development of an attribution-
based theory of motivation: A history of ideas. Edu-
cational Psychologist, 45(1), 28–36.
Weiss, H. M., & Cropanzano, R. (1996). Affective events
theory: A theoretical discussion of the structure, cau-
ses andconsequencesof affective experiences atwork.
Research in Organizational Behavior, 18, 1–74.
Weng,H.Y., Fox, A. S., Hessenthaler, H. C., Stodola, D. E., &
Davidson, R. J. (2015). The role of compassion in al-
truistic helping and punishment behavior. PLoS One,
10(12), e0143794.
Weng, H. Y., et al. (2013). Compassion training alters al-
truism and neural responses to suffering. Psychologi-
cal Science, 24(7), 1171–1180.
Williams, J. M. G. (2010). Mindfulness and psychological
process. Emotion, 10(1), 1–7.
Wortman, C. B., Brehm, J. W., & Berkowitz, L. (1975). Re-
sponses to uncontrollable outcomes. Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology, 8, 277–336.
Zaheer, A., McEvily, B., & Perrone, V. (1998). Does trust
matter? Exploring the effects of interorganizational
and interpersonal trust on performance.Organization
Science, 9(2), 141–159.
Daniel Skarlicki (skarlicki@sauder.ubc.ca) is the Edgar F.
Kaiser Professor of Organizational Behavior at the Uni-
versity of British Columbia’s Sauder School of Business.
He conducts research on the effects of organizational jus-
tice on performance and retaliation and mindfulness at
work. He received his Ph.D. from the University of
Toronto.
Adam A. Kay (adam.a.kay@gmail.com) is a Ph.D. candi-
date at the University of British Columbia’s Sauder School
of Business. He is a former multinational business man-
ager, executive coach, and international arbitration law-
yer. His research interests include mindfulness and work
performance, moral identity and pro-social behavior, and
corporate social responsibility.
Karl Aquino (karl.aquino@sauder.ubc.ca) is the Richard
Poon Professor of Organizations and Society at the Uni-
versity of British Columbia’s Sauder School of Business.
He conducts research on moral psychology, workplace
victimization, and howmangers and coworkers respond to
workplace transgressions. He received his Ph.D. in orga-
nizational behavior from Northwestern University.
David Fushtey (dfushtey@governance.dsfw.com) is an in-
ternational corporate-commercial lawyer, formerly senior
fellow at the Governance Counsel, and senior editor for
UBC Law Review. An ABA international associate, his
forthcoming text isTheDirector and theManager: Lawand
Governance in a Digital Age, Machiavelli Had It Easy (IAP,
2017).
238 AugustAcademy of Management Perspectives
